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Use the Configuration Manager Mac OS X (custom) configuration item to manage settings for macOS X devices that are managed by the Configuration Manager client.

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The macOS X operating system uses property list (.plist) files to store application settings. Use compliance settings to evaluate and remediate settings in a property list file. You can also manage macOS X settings by writing a shell script that returns a value that you can evaluate and remediate for compliance.

Create a custom macOS X configuration item

1. In the Configuration Manager console, select Assets and compliance.

2. In the Assets and Compliance workspace, expand Compliance Settings, and then select Configuration Items.

3. On the Home tab, in the Create group, select Create Configuration Item.

4. On the General page of the Create Configuration Item wizard, specify a name and optional description for the configuration item.

5. Under Specify the type of configuration item that you want to create, select Mac OS X (custom).

6. If you create and assign categories to help you search and filter configuration items in the Configuration Manager console, select Categories.

7. On the Supported Platforms page of the wizard, select the specific macOS X versions that will evaluate the configuration item.

8. On the Settings page of the wizard, add new settings that are evaluated for compliance on Mac computers. Select New to open the Create Setting dialog box.

9. In the Create Setting dialog box, enter a unique name and a description for the setting.

10. Choose the Setting type you want, and then supply the required information:

    • Mac OS X Preferences

      • Application ID: Specify the application ID of the property list file from which you want to evaluate a key for compliance.

        For example, if you want to edit settings for the Safari Web browser, you might use com.apple.Safari.plist.

      • Key: Specify the name of the key that you want to evaluate for compliance on Mac computers. Use the following syntax: //.

        Important

        The key name is case sensitive, and won't be evaluated if it differs from the key name on the Mac computer. Additionally, you can't edit the key name after you have specified it. If you need to edit the key name, delete and then re-create the setting.

    • Script

      • Discovery Script: Select Add Script, and then enter a shell script to assess settings on the Mac computer for compliance. Use the echo command in the shell script to return values to Configuration Manager for compliance. Configuration Manager uses the results returned in STDOUT to evaluate compliance.

        Important

        Don't include the reboot command in the discovery script. Because the discovery script runs each time the client restarts, this causes the Mac computer to continually restart.

      • Remediation script (optional): Optionally, select Add Script, and then enter a shell script that is used to remediate any noncompliant settings found on Mac client computers.

        Important

        To ensure that you don't introduce formatting characters that the Mac computer can't interpret, don't use copy and paste. Instead, type in the script.

11. Choose the Data type, which is the format in which the condition returns the data before it's used to evaluate the setting.

    Note

    The Floating point data type supports only 3 digits after the decimal point.

    Configuration Manager doesn't support using the Boolean data type for Mac configuration item script settings. Instead, set the data type to Integer, and ensure that the script returns an integer value.

12. Select OK to save the setting and close the Create Setting dialog box. Then continue to add as many settings as you require.

13. On the Compliance Rules page of the wizard, specify the conditions that define the compliance of a configuration item. Before a setting can be evaluated to compliance, it must have at least one compliance rule. Select New to add a new rule.

14. In the Create Rule dialog box, provide the following information:

    • Name: Enter a name for the compliance rule.

    • Description: Enter a description for the compliance rule.

    • Selected setting: Select Browse to open the Select Setting dialog box. Select the setting that you want to define a rule for, or select New Setting. When you are finished, choose Select.

      Tip

      You can also select Properties to view information about the currently selected setting.

    • Rule type: Select the type of compliance rule that you want to use:

      • Value: Create a rule that compares the value returned by the configuration item against a value that you specify.

      • Existential: Create a rule that evaluates the setting depending on whether it exists on a device.

    • For a rule type of Value, specify the following information:

      • The setting must comply with the following rule: Select an operator and a value that is assessed for compliance with the selected setting. You can use the following operators:

        • Equals

        • Not equal to

        • Greater than

        • Less than

        • Between

        • Greater than or equal to

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        • One of: In the text box, specify one entry on each line.

        • None of: In the text box, specify one entry on each line.

      • Remediate noncompliant rules when supported: Select this option if you want Configuration Manager to automatically remediate noncompliant rules.

        Important

        You can only remediate noncompliant rules when the rule operator is set to Equals.

      • Report noncompliance if this setting instance is not found: The configuration item reports noncompliance if this setting isn't found on the Mac computer.

      • Noncompliance severity for reports: Specify the severity level reported if this compliance rule fails. The available severity levels are:

        • None: Computers that fail this compliance rule don't report a failure severity for Configuration Manager reports.

        • Information: Computers that fail this compliance rule report a failure severity of Information for Configuration Manager reports.

        • Warning: Computers that fail this compliance rule report a failure severity of Warning for Configuration Manager reports.

        • Critical: Computers that fail this compliance rule report a failure severity of Critical for Configuration Manager reports.

        • Critical with event: Computers that fail this compliance rule report a failure severity of Critical for Configuration Manager reports. The Mac client computer also logs this severity level.

    • For a rule type of Existential, specify the following information:

      • Choose either:

        • The setting must exist on client devices

        • The setting must not exist on client devices

      • Noncompliance severity for reports: Specify the severity level that is reported if this compliance rule fails. The available severity levels are:

        • None: Computers that fail this compliance rule don't report a failure severity for Configuration Manager reports.

        • Information: Computers that fail this compliance rule report a failure severity of Information for Configuration Manager reports.

        • Warning: Computers that fail this compliance rule report a failure severity of Warning for Configuration Manager reports.

        • Critical: Computers that fail this compliance rule report a failure severity of Critical for Configuration Manager reports.

        • Critical with event: Computers that fail this compliance rule report a failure severity of Critical for Configuration Manager reports. The Mac client computer also logs this severity level.

      Note

      The options shown might vary, depending on the setting type you are configuring a rule for.

15. Select OK to close the Create Rule dialog box.

16. On the Summary page, confirm the settings for the new configuration item. Then, complete the wizard.

See the new configuration item in the Configuration Items node of the Assets and Compliance workspace.

If you now want to add this configuration item to a configuration baseline, see How to create configuration baselines.

Next steps

In cryptography, a message authentication code (MAC), sometimes known as a tag, is a short piece of information used to authenticate a message—in other words, to confirm that the message came from the stated sender (its authenticity) and has not been changed. The MAC value protects a message's data integrity, as well as its authenticity, by allowing verifiers (who also possess the secret key) to detect any changes to the message content.

Terminology[edit]

The term message integrity code (MIC) is frequently substituted for the term MAC, especially in communications^[1] to distinguish it from the use of the latter as media access control address (MAC address). However, some authors^[2] use MIC to refer to a message digest, which aims only to uniquely but opaquely identify a single message. RFC 4949 recommends avoiding the term message integrity code (MIC), and instead using checksum, error detection code, hash, keyed hash, message authentication code, or protected checksum.

Definitions[edit]

Informally, a message authentication code system consists of three algorithms:

• A key generation algorithm selects a key from the key space uniformly at random.
• A signing algorithm efficiently returns a tag given the key and the message.
• A verifying algorithm efficiently verifies the authenticity of the message given the key and the tag. That is, return accepted when the message and tag are not tampered with or forged, and otherwise return rejected.

A secure message authentication code must resist attempts by an adversary to forge tags, for arbitrary, select, or all messages, including under conditions of known- or chosen-plaintext. It should be computationally infeasible to compute a valid tag of the given message without knowledge of the key, even if for the worst case, we assume the adversary knows the tag of any message but the one in question.^[3]

Formally, a message authentication code (MAC) system is a triple of efficient^[4] algorithms (G, S, V) satisfying:

• G (key-generator) gives the key k on input 1ⁿ, where n is the security parameter.
• S (signing) outputs a tag t on the key k and the input string x.
• V (verifying) outputs accepted or rejected on inputs: the key k, the string x and the tag t.

S and V must satisfy the following:

Pr [ k ← G(1ⁿ), V( k, x, S(k, x) ) = accepted ] = 1.^[5]

A MAC is unforgeable if for every efficient adversary A

Pr [ k ← G(1ⁿ), (x, t) ← A^{S(k, · )}(1ⁿ), x ∉ Query(A^{S(k, · )}, 1ⁿ), V(k, x, t) = accepted] < negl(n),

where A^{S(k, · )} denotes that A has access to the oracle S(k, · ), and Query(A^{S(k, · )}, 1ⁿ) denotes the set of the queries on S made by A, which knows n. Clearly we require that any adversary cannot directly query the string x on S, since otherwise a valid tag can be easily obtained by that adversary.^[6]

Security[edit]

While MAC functions are similar to cryptographic hash functions, they possess different security requirements. To be considered secure, a MAC function must resist existential forgery under chosen-plaintext attacks. This means that even if an attacker has access to an oracle which possesses the secret key and generates MACs for messages of the attacker's choosing, the attacker cannot guess the MAC for other messages (which were not used to query the oracle) without performing infeasible amounts of computation.

MACs differ from digital signatures as MAC values are both generated and verified using the same secret key. This implies that the sender and receiver of a message must agree on the same key before initiating communications, as is the case with symmetric encryption. For the same reason, MACs do not provide the property of non-repudiation offered by signatures specifically in the case of a network-wide shared secret key: any user who can verify a MAC is also capable of generating MACs for other messages. In contrast, a digital signature is generated using the private key of a key pair, which is public-key cryptography.^[4] Since this private key is only accessible to its holder, a digital signature proves that a document was signed by none other than that holder. Thus, digital signatures do offer non-repudiation. However, non-repudiation can be provided by systems that securely bind key usage information to the MAC key; the same key is in the possession of two people, but one has a copy of the key that can be used for MAC generation while the other has a copy of the key in a hardware security module that only permits MAC verification. This is commonly done in the finance industry.^{[citation needed]}

Implementation[edit]

MAC algorithms can be constructed from other cryptographic primitives, like cryptographic hash functions (as in the case of HMAC) or from block cipher algorithms (OMAC, CCM, GCM, and PMAC). However many of the fastest MAC algorithms like UMAC-VMAC and Poly1305-AES are constructed based on universal hashing.^[7]

Intrinsically keyed hash algorithms such as SipHash are also by definition MACs; they can be even faster than universal-hashing based MACs.^[8]

Additionally, the MAC algorithm can deliberately combine two or more cryptographic primitives, so as to maintain protection even if one of them is later found to be vulnerable. For instance, in Transport Layer Security (TLS), the input data is split in halves that are each processed with a different hashing primitive (SHA-1 and SHA-2) then XORed together to output the MAC.

One-time MAC[edit]

Universal hashing and in particular pairwise independent hash functions provide a secure message authentication code as long as the key is used at most once. This can be seen as the one-time pad for authentication.^[9]

The simplest such pairwise independent hash function is defined by the random key, key = (a, b), and the MAC tag for a message m is computed as tag = (am + b) mod p, where p is prime.

More generally, k-independent hashing functions provide a secure message authentication code as long as the key is used less than k times for k-ways independent hashing functions.

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Message authentication codes and data origin authentication have been also discussed in the framework of quantum cryptography. By contrast to other cryptographic tasks, such as key distribution, for a rather broad class of quantum MACs it has been shown that quantum resources do not offer any advantage over unconditionally secure one-time classical MACs.^[10]

Standards[edit]

Various standards exist that define MAC algorithms. These include:

• FIPS PUB 113 Computer Data Authentication,^[11] withdrawn in 2002,^[12] defines an algorithm based on DES.
• FIPS PUB 198-1 The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)^[13]
• ISO/IEC 9797-1Mechanisms using a block cipher^[14]
• ISO/IEC 9797-2 Mechanisms using a dedicated hash-function^[15]
• ISO/IEC 9797-3 Mechanisms using a universal hash-function^[16]
• ISO/IEC 29192-6 Lightweight cryptography - Message authentication codes^[17]

ISO/IEC 9797-1 and -2 define generic models and algorithms that can be used with any block cipher or hash function, and a variety of different parameters. These models and parameters allow more specific algorithms to be defined by nominating the parameters. For example, the FIPS PUB 113 algorithm is functionally equivalent to ISO/IEC 9797-1 MAC algorithm 1 with padding method 1 and a block cipher algorithm of DES.

An example of MAC use[edit]

^[18] In this example, the sender of a message runs it through a MAC algorithm to produce a MAC data tag. The message and the MAC tag are then sent to the receiver. The receiver in turn runs the message portion of the transmission through the same MAC algorithm using the same key, producing a second MAC data tag. The receiver then compares the first MAC tag received in the transmission to the second generated MAC tag. If they are identical, the receiver can safely assume that the message was not altered or tampered with during transmission (data integrity).

However, to allow the receiver to be able to detect replay attacks, the message itself must contain data that assures that this same message can only be sent once (e.g. time stamp, sequence number or use of a one-time MAC). Otherwise an attacker could – without even understanding its content – record this message and play it back at a later time, producing the same result as the original sender.

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See also[edit]

• Hash-based message authentication code (HMAC)

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Notes[edit]

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1. ^IEEE 802.11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications(PDF). (2007 revision). IEEE-SA. 12 June 2007. doi:10.1109/IEEESTD.2007.373646. ISBN978-0-7381-5656-9.
2. ^Fred B Schneider, Hashes and Message Digests, Cornell University
3. ^The strongest adversary is assumed to have access to the signing algorithm without knowing the key. However, her final forged message must be different from any message she chose to query the signing algorithm before. See Pass's discussions before def 134.2.
4. ^ ^abTheoretically, an efficient algorithm runs within probabilistic polynomial time.
5. ^Pass, def 134.1
6. ^Pass, def 134.2
7. ^'VMAC: Message Authentication Code using Universal Hashing'. CFRG Working Group. Retrieved 16 March 2010.
8. ^Jean-Philippe Aumasson & Daniel J. Bernstein (2012-09-18). 'SipHash: a fast short-input PRF'(PDF).
9. ^Simmons, Gustavus (1985). 'Authentication theory/coding theory'. Advances in Cryptology: Proceedings of CRYPTO 84. Berlin: Springer. pp. 411–431.
10. ^Nikolopoulos, Georgios M.; Fischlin, Marc (2020). 'Information-Theoretically Secure Data Origin Authentication with Quantum and Classical Resources'. Cryptography. 4 (4): 31. arXiv:2011.06849. doi:10.3390/cryptography4040031. S2CID226956062.
11. ^'FIPS PUB 113 Computer Data Authentication'. Archived from the original on 2011-09-27. Retrieved 2010-10-10.
12. ^'Federal Information Processing Standards Publications, Withdrawn FIPS Listed by Number'. Archived from the original on 2010-08-01. Retrieved 2010-10-10.
13. ^The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
14. ^ISO/IEC 9797-1 Information technology — Security techniques — Message Authentication Codes (MACs) — Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher
15. ^ISO/IEC 9797-2 Information technology — Security techniques — Message Authentication Codes (MACs) — Part 2: Mechanisms using a dedicated hash-function
16. ^ISO/IEC 9797-3 Information technology — Security techniques — Message Authentication Codes (MACs) — Part 3: Mechanisms using a universal hash-function
17. ^ISO/IEC 29192-6 Information technology — Lightweight cryptography — Part 6: Message authentication codes (MACs)
18. ^'Mac Security Overview', Mac® Security Bible, Wiley Publishing, Inc., 2011-11-01, pp. 1–26, doi:10.1002/9781118257739.ch1, ISBN9781118257739

References[edit]

• Goldreich, Oded (2001), Foundations of cryptography I: Basic Tools, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ISBN978-0-511-54689-1
• Goldreich, Oded (2004), Foundations of cryptography II: Basic Applications (1. publ. ed.), Cambridge [u.a.]: Cambridge Univ. Press, ISBN978-0-521-83084-3
• Pass, Rafael, A Course in Cryptography(PDF), retrieved 31 December 2015^[1]

External links[edit]

1. ^11-12-20C8